



                                                                   
MARC FINK∗
Logging After Wildfire:  Salvaging Economic 
Value or Mugging a Burn Victim? 
In recent years, the United States Department of Agriculture Forest 
Service (“Forest Service”) has shifted more of its focus and resources 
to issues concerning wildfires on national forests.  In the decades 
following World War II, the Forest Service focused on commercial 
timber sales and road construction.  From 1960 through 1990, logging 
levels on national forests ranged from approximately nine to twelve 
billion board feet per year.1  During this time period, the Forest 
Service constructed much of the 400,000 miles of logging roads 
remaining throughout the National Forest System.2  While it was 
building roads and planning timber sales, the Forest Service was also 
suppressing nearly every wildfire that ignited on the national forests.3
By 1995, timber harvest levels on the national forests had 
decreased to under four billion board feet, and by 2000, the levels had 
fallen to approximately two billion board feet.4  While commercial 
logging and harvest levels significantly declined, the Forest Service 
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1 U.S. FOREST SERVICE, U.S.D.A., SOUTHERN FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT 
TIMBR-1:  TIMBER PRODUCTS SUPPLY AND DEMAND Fig. 2 (2001) [hereinafter SFRA], 
available at http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/sustain/ draft/timbr1/timbr1-16.htm (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2004); see also ROSS W. GORTE, CONF. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS: TIMBER HARVESTING AND FOREST FIRES 1 (Aug. 22, 2000). 
2 See National Forest System Road Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,676-01 (proposed 
March 3, 2000). 
3 See RANDAL O’TOOLE, REFORMING THE FIRE SERVICE: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL 
FIRE BUDGETS AND INCENTIVES 5 (2002). 
4 SFRA, supra note 1; GORTE, supra note 1, at 1; FOREST AND RANGELAND MGMT., 
USFS, USDA, at http://www.fs.fed.us/forestmanagement/reports/sold-harvest/index.shtml 
(last modified Feb. 7, 2004). 
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was dramatically increasing its fire-related budget.  Between the early 
1990s and 2001, the Forest Service’s fire budget increased from $415 
million to $1.8 billion.5
Under the current Bush Administration, the Forest Service has 
combined its focus on both wildfire and commercial timber harvest.  
Instead of logging national forests to provide a steady supply of 
timber for local mills, much of the Forest Service’s current emphasis 
is on logging trees in order to save forests from catastrophic wildfires.  
To achieve this goal, the Forest Service currently focuses on pre-fire 
“thinning” and post-fire logging projects.  The agency does this, even 
though the current buildup of fuels on national forests is the result of 
past Forest Service fire suppression, and the fact that weather,6 and 
not the buildup of fuels, may be the primary reason for recent severe 
wildfires.  At the same time, the Forest Service continues its policy of 
suppressing nearly all wildfires, with aggressive fire7 fighting tactics, 
including bulldozed fire-lines, chemical fire retardant, and back-fires 
set by the agency.8
The Forest Service’s standard practice is to follow severe wildfires 
with proposed post-fire timber sales.9  The recent increase in the 
number and size of wildfires has led to an increase in the number and 
size of proposed post-fire logging projects.10  Not surprisingly, these 
increases have resulted in an increase in the amount of post-fire 
logging litigation.  As much as the timber industry desires to 
immediately log the burned trees to salvage their economic value, 
conservationists view recently and severely burned areas as sensitive 
locations where significant commercial logging should not be 
permitted.  This paper addresses some common themes and issues 
that have emerged in post-fire cases over the past few years. 
 
5 O’TOOLE, supra note 3, at 10. 
6 Id at 5, 14. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 5. 
9 See Pac. Northwest Research Station, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Postfire Logging: Is It 
Beneficial to a Forest?, SCIENCE FINDINGS 1, 3 (Oct. 2002). 
10 Because the size and acreage of green timber sales on national forests has steadily 
declined, the overall percentage of salvage sales has increased.  In 2003, post-fire timber 
sales proposals made up nearly half the total logging volume planned for the National 
Forest System.  AMERICAN LANDS ALLIANCE, RESTORATION OR EXPLOITATION?  POST-
FIRE SALVAGE LOGGING IN AMERICA’S NATIONAL FORESTS 3 (2003). 
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I 
COMMON THEMES IN POST-FIRE LOGGING CASES 
In recent post-fire logging litigation, there have been at least four 
common themes.  First, the Forest Service routinely attempts to 
expedite the logging process as soon as possible.  However, these 
attempts have been largely unsuccessful, and as a result, the Forest 
Service recently changed rules to allow for more flexibility.  Second, 
the Forest Service has been largely unwilling to disclose or address 
the available scientific evidence that cautions against logging after 
severe wildfires.  Third, the Forest Service has failed, thus far, to 
account for the substantial environmental impacts of its previous 
firefighting activities within the proposed areas. 
A fourth theme has emerged more recently and is likely to be 
involved in future post-fire logging cases.  Increasingly, the Forest 
Service is promoting the creation and maintenance of permanent “fuel 
management zones” or “fuel breaks” as part of its purpose and need 
for post-fire logging projects.  The issues arising from the use of fuel 
breaks include the Forest Service’s obligation to demonstrate and 
maintain the effectiveness of fuel breaks and potential environmental 
impacts associated with the required maintenance. 
A.  Forest Service Attempts to Expedite and/or Sidestep the Regular 
Process 
One constant in post-fire cases is the confrontation between 
economics and science.  On one side, the timber industry would like 
to see the burned trees logged and removed as quickly as possible to 
recover or salvage their economic value.  Burned trees lose economic 
value over time, and so from an industry perspective, delay means 
lost revenues.  On the other side, conservationists view severely 
burned forests as one of the last places to which the Forest Service 
should be looking for commercial logging projects in national forests 
due to their already sensitive condition resulting from the fire. 
Thus far, it would appear that the industry voice has been loudest 
within the Forest Service, as the agency has routinely sought ways to 
expedite the regular process for post-fire timber sales.  As seen below, 
the Forest Service has creatively relied on a number of special 
provisions for various post-fire projects but the agency has been 
largely unsuccessful in litigation on this issue.  Therefore, the Forest 
Service has recently sought additional means, through both new 
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legislation and revised administrative rules and regulations, to speed 
up its regular planning process. 
1.  Breaking a Post-fire Logging Strategy into Smaller, Individual 
Projects 
In 1996, the Tower Fire swept through the North Fork John Day 
watershed in Eastern Oregon and became the largest wildfire in the 
recorded history of the Umatilla National Forest.11  Immediately, the 
Forest Service developed a post-fire logging strategy for several 
thousand acres of burned forest.12  The National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for any major federal action 
that may significantly impact the environment.13  For the Tower Fire, 
however, the Forest Service did not prepare an EIS to assess the 
overall impacts of its post-fire logging strategy.  The Forest Service 
instead developed a number of smaller logging projects, with each 
either assessed separately in an individual Environmental Assessment 
(“EA”),14 or “categorically excluded”15 from NEPA review. 
The Forest Service’s decision to divide its overall post-fire strategy 
into separate logging projects was intentionally designed to speed up 
the administrative process for these post-fire timber sales.  As 
explained by the Forest Service, “its decision to ‘conduct separate 
NEPA analysis on subsequent projects . . . not only simplifies the 
NEPA analysis, but . . . also allows some projects to move forward if 
other projects get snagged in appeals and/or litigation.’”16  In a letter 
to timber companies, the Forest Service further explained that its 
 
11 Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
12 Id. 
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d at 1211. 
14 “As a preliminary step, an agency may prepare an EA to decide whether the 
environmental impact of a proposed action is significant enough to warrant preparation of 
an EIS.”  Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d at 1212, citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.  “An EA is a 
‘concise public document that briefly provide[s] sufficient evidence and analysis for 
determining whether to prepare an EIS or a finding of no significant impact.’”  Id. (quoting 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9). 
15 “Categorical exclusion” is defined as “a category of actions which do not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment . . . and 
for which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact 
statement is required.”  40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. 
16 Blue Mountains, 161 F.3d at 1215 n.6. 
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post-fire strategy emphasized “multiple, smaller scale project NEPA 
preparation to achieve quick success.”17
In Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, a number of 
environmental organizations filed suit to challenge the Big Tower 
project, the largest of the individual timber sales planned for the 
Tower Fire area.18  The plaintiffs argued that NEPA required the 
Forest Service to assess the entire post-fire strategy in a single EIS.  
After losing at the district court level, the plaintiffs appealed and the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.  The NEPA regulations state 
that a significance determination and obligation to prepare an EIS 
“cannot be avoided by . . . breaking [an action] down into small 
component parts.”19  “If several actions have a cumulative 
environmental effect, ‘this consequence must be considered in an 
EIS.’”20
For the Tower Fire area, the Forest Service had identified five post-
fire logging projects within the same watershed, which together 
required the logging of forty to fifty-five million board feet of timber 
and the construction of approximately twenty miles of road.21  All of 
the proposed timber sales were reasonably foreseeable, as they were 
developed as part of a comprehensive post-fire strategy.22  The Ninth 
Circuit held that the proposed sales, at the very least, raised 
substantial questions whether significant impacts would occur which 
would require an EIS.23  Therefore, the court “impose[d] the ‘snag’ 
that the Forest Service feared but the law requires.”24
Even though the Forest Service’s approach to the Tower Fire was 
ultimately rejected by the Ninth Circuit, in some regards, it was 
successful for the Forest Service and timber companies.  Due to both 
the district court ruling in favor of the Forest Service and the Ninth 
Circuit initially declining the plaintiffs’ request for a stay of the 
logging, over half of the trees in the Big Tower project area were 
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1208. 
19 Id. at 1215 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7)). 
20 Id. at 1214 (quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest Serv., 137 
F.3d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
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logged and removed by the time the Ninth Circuit enjoined the 
sales.25
2.  Eliminating the Administrative Appeal Process 
In 1992, Congress enacted the Forest Service Decisionmaking and 
Appeals Reform Act, to guarantee a person’s right to file 
administrative appeals of Forest Service decisions.26  Persons or 
organizations who have been involved in the public comment process 
for Forest Service projects are allowed to administratively appeal the 
final Forest Service decision within forty-five days.27  If an 
administrative appeal is filed, the Forest Service is ordinarily not 
allowed to implement the challenged decision until fifteen days 
following the disposition of the appeal.28
For the Bitterroot post-fire logging project in Western Montana, 
the Forest Service attempted to forego the mandatory administrative 
appeal process.29  Wildfires burned large portions of the Bitterroot 
National Forest in the summer of 2000.  Subsequently, the Forest 
Service developed a post-fire logging proposal and prepared an EIS.30  
Instead of having the forest supervisor for the Bitterroot National 
Forest sign the record of decision for the Bitterroot project, the 
decision was signed by Undersecretary of Agriculture Mark Rey.31  
The Forest Service maintained that Mark Rey’s signature eliminated 
the need for the Forest Service to allow administrative appeals and 
that Rey’s approval “constituted the final administrative 
determination for the project.”32
In Wilderness Society v. Rey, a number of environmental 
organizations filed suit to enjoin the Bitterroot project and to force the 
Forest Service to comply with the Appeals Reform Act.33  The 
government’s basic argument was that the Appeals Reform Act only 
requires an administrative appeal for decisions of the Forest Service.  
Since the Bitterroot decision was signed by the Undersecretary of 
 
25 Id. 
26 See Wilderness Soc’y v. Rey, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1147 (D. Mont. 2002). 
27 Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 102-381, § 
322, 106 Stat. 1374 (1992). 
28 36 C.F.R. § 215.17 (2003). 
29 See Wilderness Soc’y, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1141. 
30 Id. at 1143-44. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1142-43. 
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Agriculture, the decision was exempt from the law that requires 
administrative appeals.34  As recognized by the district court, under 
the government’s argument, the Forest Service could completely 
circumvent the administrative appeals process for any controversial 
project by simply having the Undersecretary sign the decision.35
The government’s argument, although creative, was flatly rejected 
by the district court.  As stated by Chief Judge Donald Molloy: 
The notion that a signature by the Undersecretary transforms the 
action from Forest Service business to the business of some other 
agency is mystical legal prestidigitation.  The decision, not the 
signatory, is the operative fact for purposes of the Appeals Reform 
Act.  The Secretary may not escape her statutory duty to provide an 
appeals process by completing the signature line of a Forest Service 
record of decision.36
Therefore, the Bitterroot logging project was enjoined and 
remanded back to the Forest Service, which was ordered to comply 
with the Appeals Reform Act. 
The Forest Service had tried to forego the administrative appeal 
requirement to expedite the process.37  As stated by the Forest 
Service’s attorney, the advantage to cutting out the administrative 
appeal was to get the project underway and eliminate the 105 day 
delay that would otherwise ensue.38  The court recognized, however, 
that the administrative appeal process serves legitimate functions in 
the deliberative process.  Such functions include providing interested 
participants the opportunity to question the assumptions or science 
relied upon by the agency and assuring compliance with applicable 
standards, science, and sound analysis.39  By attempting to avoid the 
mandatory appeals, the Forest Service contributed to the difficulty 
that it was trying to avoid for the controversial post-fire project.  
Judge Molloy stated that “[t]he action taken by the Forest Service 
here tends to cause the affected communities of interest to polarize, 
while the appeal process Congress requires is intended to harmonize 
to the extent possible the various interests in the decision-making 
process.”40
 
34 Id. at 1147. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 1148. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 1149, n.4. 
39 Id. at 1148-49. 
40 Id. at 1143. 
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3.  Eliminating the Mandatory Stay During the Administrative Appeal 
Process 
In 1999, the Big Bar Complex wildfires burned through parts of the 
Six Rivers National Forest in Northern California and the Forest 
Service began preparing for post-fire logging.41  Even though the area 
had just burned, the Forest Service’s main concern was that the area 
would soon burn again.  The Forest Service maintained that 
commercial logging was necessary to reduce the threat and intensity 
of a future fire.  The agency, therefore, named its Big Bar logging 
project “Fuels Reduction for Community Protection, Phase 1.”  
Unlike the Big Tower project, the Forest Service prepared an EIS.  
Additionally, unlike the Bitterroot project, the Forest Service allowed 
interested parties to administratively appeal the record of decision.  
For the Big Bar wildfires, however, the Forest Service decided that it 
would not stay the project while it considered the administrative 
appeals due to emergency conditions that required urgent action.42  
Therefore, as soon as the record of decision was signed, the Forest 
Service allowed logging to commence.43
The Forest Service’s regulations generally do not allow a project to 
be implemented until fifteen days following the date that 
administrative appeals are resolved.44  The regulations in effect at the 
time of the Big Bar project did provide a limited exception to the 
automatic stay provision, allowing the Chief of the Forest Service to 
determine if there is an emergency situation.45  An emergency was 
defined as an “unexpected event, or a serious occurrence or a situation 
requiring urgent action.”  An example of such an emergency was 
“[h]azardous or unsafe situations as a result of wildfire.”46  In May 
2001, the forest supervisor for the Six Rivers National Forest 
requested an emergency declaration for the majority of the Big Bar 
logging project, asserting that there were hazardous and unsafe 
conditions due to the high probability of future wildfires in the area.47  
Forest Service Chief Dale Bosworth granted the emergency request 
 
41 See Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 971, 977-78 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
42 See generally Court Transcript, Sierra Club v. Bosworth, No. C-01-2626-SC (N.D. 
Cal. July 12, 2001) (on file with author). 
43 Id. 
44 36 C.F.R. § 215.10(b) (1993). 
45 Id. 
46 36 C.F.R. § 215.10(d)(1)(ii) (1993). 
47 See Letter from Six Rivers National Forest Supervisor, to Dale Bosworth, Forest 
Service Chief (May 14, 2001) (on file with author). 
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“to address the potential significant risk to human health and safety to 
the local communities in the affected area . . . if actions are not 
initiated this summer.”48
Environmental groups immediately brought suit to challenge the 
emergency determination for the Big Bar project and moved for 
injunctive relief to stop the logging and to force the Forest Service to 
stay the project while considering the administrative appeals.49  The 
plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Bosworth relied extensively on Forest 
Service documents to argue that the agency had no scientific support 
for its emergency situation determination and had failed to address 
contradictory evidence.  In fact, the EIS itself for the Big Bar project 
acknowledged that there was no immediate threat of future wildfire 
and that implementing the logging project would actually elevate the 
fire hazard in the short term. 
In January 2000, the Forest Service’s Pacific Northwest Research 
Station reviewed all available post-fire logging studies and “found no 
studies documenting a reduction in fire intensity in a stand that had 
previously burned and then been logged.”50  The Forest Service’s 
post-fire review considered the 1995 Beschta Report, in which the 
authors were “aware of no evidence supporting the contention that 
leaving large dead woody material significantly increases the 
probability of reburn.”51  The review also considered the Forest 
Service’s 1995 Everett Report which found that “[t]here is no support 
in the scientific literature that the probability for reburn is greater in 
post-fire tree retention areas than in salvage logged sites.” 52  
Conversely, according to the Everett Report, current research suggests 
that salvage logged areas may have elevated fire hazards compared to 
unlogged sites for the first twenty years.53
 
48 Letter from Dale Bosworth, Forest Service Chief to Six Rivers National Forest 
Supervisor (May 25, 2001) (on file with author). 
49 See Court Transcript, Sierra Club v. Bosworth, No. C-01-2626-SC (N.D. Cal. July 
12, 2001) (on file with author). 
50 PAC. NORTHWEST RESEARCH STATION, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ENVIRONMENTAL 
EFFECTS OF POST-FIRE LOGGING: LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
19 (2000). 
51 ROBERT L. BESCHTA, DR. ET AL., WILDFIRE AND SALVAGE LOGGING: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ECOLOGICALLY SOUND POST-FIRE SALVAGE MANAGEMENT 
AND OTHER POST-FIRE TREATMENTS ON FEDERAL LANDS IN THE WEST (1995), available 
at http://www.saveamericasforests.org/congress/ Fire/Beschta-report.htm. 
52 Memorandum from Richard Everett, Science Team Leader, Wenatchee FSL, to the 
Regional Forester 4 (August 17, 1995) (regarding the Review of Recommendations for 
Post-Fire Management) (on file with author). 
53 Id. at 5. 
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The Everett Report recognized that the urgency to log after intense 
wildfire is primarily based on economics.54  The Forest Service had 
earlier concluded, however, that economics is not a legitimate reason 
for a stay exemption under the administrative appeal regulations.55  
Chief Judge Marilyn Patel of the Northern District of California 
agreed with the plaintiffs.  She concluded that there was no evidence 
of immediate danger or hazard, that the real issue was economics, and 
that, at least in the context of the motion for a temporary restraining 
order, the Forest Service was not justified in an exemption from the 
normal administrative appeal processes.56  The ongoing logging for 
the Big Bar project was therefore enjoined and the Forest Service 
withdrew its emergency determination and stayed the project while it 
considered the administrative appeals. 
4.  New Tools to Potentially Expedite the Process for Post-Fire 
Timber Sales 
Under the current Bush Administration, the Forest Service has 
frequently claimed that national forests are in a state of “analysis 
paralysis,” in that the agency is subject to unnecessary planning and 
evaluating, when it should be focused more on action.  In response, 
the agency has recently been granted new tools to expedite timber 
sales in a number of situations.  Many of these new tools, however, 
have already been judicially challenged.  The courts will no doubt be 
involved in helping to define the propriety and limits of the new 
regulatory and statutory provisions. 
a.  New “Categorical Exclusions” 
As stated above, federal agencies are required to prepare a detailed 
EIS for proposed actions that may significantly impact the 
environment.  Agencies often prepare less detailed EAs to determine 
whether an EIS is required.  The Council of Environmental Quality’s 
(CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA also direct federal agencies to 
 
54 Id. at 6. 
55 In Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. Worthington, 125 F. Supp. 2d 839 (E.D. Ky. 2000), 
the court enjoined the Forest Service from proceeding with logging pursuant to an 
emergency situation determination.  On reconsideration, Forest Service Chief Michael 
Dombeck emphasized that economics is not a normally accepted rationale for a stay 
exemption and that the record must instead demonstrate an imminent risk to public health 
and safety, private property, or the environment. 
56 See Court Transcript, Sierra Club v. Bosworth, C-01-2626-SC (N.D. Cal. July 12, 
2001) (on file with author). 
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determine the actions that normally do not have any significant 
impact on the environment and, therefore, do not require either an EA 
or EIS.57  These categories of actions are referred to as “categorical 
exclusions.”58
The Forest Service Handbook lists the categories of “routine” 
actions that the Forest Service normally excludes from NEPA 
review.59  These categories include such things as mowing lawns at a 
district office, resurfacing a road, reconstructing a trail, and girdling 
trees to create snags.60  The Forest Service used to include a 
categorical exclusion for timber harvests removing up to 250,000 
board feet and salvage timber harvests logging up to one million 
board feet of timber.61  In Heartwood v. United States Forest Service, 
however, this category was determined to be invalid and the court 
entered “a nationwide injunction against the timber harvest 
[categorical exclusion].”62  The court found that the Forest Service 
“did not provide any rationale for why this magnitude of timber sales 
would not have a significant effect on the environment.”63
In 2003, as part of the Bush Administration’s “Healthy Forests 
Initiative,” the Forest Service created new categories of activities to 
be excluded from NEPA review and procedures.  In June 2003, the 
agency published notice of a new categorical exclusion for 
mechanical hazardous fuels reduction projects (i.e., logging) up to one 
thousand acres in size.64  Since the Forest Service often claims that 
post-fire timber sales are actually “fuels reduction” projects, it may 
attempt to rely on this new categorical exclusion for future post-fire 
logging projects.  In addition, in July 2003, the Forest Service 
published notice of new categorical exclusions for “limited timber 
harvest” including the “salvage of dead and/or dying trees” on up to 
 
57 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(a)(2), 1507.3; Heartwood v. U.S. Forest Serv., 73 F. Supp. 2d 
962, 965 (S.D. Ill. 1999). 
58 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (“Categorical exclusion means a category of actions which do not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and 
which have been found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency 
in implementation of these regulations (§ 1507.3) and for which, therefore, neither an 
environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required.”). 
59 USFS, FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
HANDBOOK, § 1909.15, 31.1(b) (1992). 
60 Id. §§ 1909, 31.1(b), 31.2. 
61 Heartwood, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 967, 974-75. 
62 Id. at 980. 
63 Id. at 975. 
64 National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire Management 
Activities: Categorical Exclusions, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814, 33,815 (June 5, 2003). 
 
210       J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19(1), 2004] 
                                                                   
250 acres.65  As stated in the Federal Register, “[t]his categorical 
exclusion allows salvage harvest in areas where trees have been 
severely damaged by forces such as fire, wind, ice, insects, or disease 
and still have some economic value as a forest product.”66  Initial 
court decisions on the overall legality and the site-specific 
appropriateness of these new categorical exclusions will go a long 
way towards determining the frequency to which they are used and 
relied upon by the Forest Service for future post-fire logging projects. 
b.  The Revised Administrative Appeal Regulations 
On June 4, 2003, the Forest Service published a final rule to 
substantially revise the procedures for administratively appealing 
Forest Service projects.67  The new appeal regulations make 
important changes that the Forest Service will likely try to use to 
expedite post-fire projects.  First, in response to Wilderness Society v. 
Rey, the new regulations provide that decisions of the Secretary of 
Agriculture or Undersecretary of Natural Resources and Environment 
are not subject to the administrative appeal procedures.68  Therefore, 
the Forest Service has taken the argument that the courts rejected in 
Wilderness Society and inserted it into the revised regulations. 
The problem for the Forest Service, however, is that Judge Donald 
Molloy in Wilderness Society found the Forest Service’s argument to 
be inconsistent with the Appeals Reform Act.69  Adding the provision 
to the agency’s regulations does not make it more consistent with the 
underlying statute.  Therefore, the provision should be found illegal.  
In enacting the Appeals Reform Act, Congress sought to ensure that 
project-level decisions on national forests are subject to 
administrative appeals.70  The Forest Service should not be allowed 
to circumvent the appeal process, and the intent of Congress, by 
simply having the Undersecretary sign a controversial decision. 
Through the revised appeal regulations, the Forest Service has also 
attempted to address its unfavorable ruling in the Big Bar litigation.  
 
65 National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Limited Timber 
Harvest, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,598 (July 29, 2003). 
66 Id. 
67 Notice, Comment, and Appeal Procedures for National Forest System Projects and 
Activities, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,582 (June 4, 2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 215). 
68 Notice, Comment, and Appeal Procedures for National Forest System Projects and 
Activities, 36 C.F.R. § 215.20(b) (2003). 
69 Wilderness Soc’y v. Rey, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (D. Mont. 2002). 
70 See id. at 1147. 
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As before, when the Forest Service determines that an emergency 
situation exists with respect to a site-specific decision, it does not 
need to stay the decision during the administrative appeal process but 
may instead implement the decision as soon as it is signed.71  The 
new regulations, however, broaden the definition of “emergency 
situation” to include situations “that would result in substantial loss of 
economic value to the Federal Government if implementation of the 
decision were delayed.”72  Since burned trees typically lose economic 
value over time, the Forest Service will likely argue for some post-fire 
projects by stating that the federal government will lose substantial 
economic value if implementation of the project is delayed by the 
normal administrative stay provision. 
By relying on the new economic value provision, the Forest 
Service will place the economics of a proposed post-fire timber sale 
directly at issue.  This may lead to unintended results for the Forest 
Service, in both litigation and public opinion, as the economic costs 
of a post-fire timber sale may often exceed any economic benefits.73  
At the very least, increased attempts by the Forest Service to avoid 
the normal administrative stay provision will further increase 
litigation.  Citizens will be forced to seek immediate judicial relief to 
enjoin imminent logging in order to ensure that their arguments and 
concerns are allowed to be heard while trees remain standing. 
Most importantly, the new administrative appeal regulations 
exempt all projects that have been “categorically excluded” from 
NEPA.74  As noted above, the Forest Service has significantly 
expanded the categories of actions where it claims no NEPA review is 
required.  As a result, the number of Forest Service actions that the 
agency now claims exempt from administrative appeal will likely be 
significantly expanded.  This again appears to contradict the intent 
and purpose of the Appeals Reform Act and will likely be challenged 
in court. 
c.  The Healthy Forests Restoration Act 
In December 2003, President Bush signed the Healthy Forests 
Restoration Act of 2003.  The stated purpose of the Act is to reduce 
 
71 36 C.F.R. § 215.10(c) (2003). 
72 36 C.F.R. § 215.2 (2003). 
73 See generally, ECONORTHWEST, ECONOMIC ISSUES UNDERLYING PROPOSALS TO 
CONDUCT SALVAGE LOGGING IN AREAS BURNED BY THE BISCUIT FIRE, available at 
http://www.salmonandeconomy.org/pdf/ BiscuitFireEcon.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). 
74 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.11, 215.12(f) (2003). 
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wildfire risk through the implementation of hazardous fuels reduction 
projects.75  Since the Forest Service has argued in the past that post-
fire logging may decrease the risk of future fires, the agency may 
attempt to utilize this new statute for future post-fire logging 
projects.76  First, the Forest Service would need to demonstrate that 
the proposed logging project is authorized under the Act.  Hazardous 
fuel reduction projects may be authorized in: wildland-urban interface 
areas; certain municipal watersheds; lands that are at significant threat 
from windthrow, blowdown, ice storm damage, or insects and 
disease, and; threatened and endangered species habitat where the 
agency has identified wildfire as a threat to the species and where the 
proposed logging would “provide enhanced protection from 
catastrophic wildfire for the species.”77
If the Forest Service is able to demonstrate that a proposed project 
fits within the hazardous fuel reduction projects authorized by the 
Act, special provisions would then apply that would expedite the 
process.  For instance, NEPA would still apply, but the agency may 
be allowed to consider fewer alternatives to its proposal.  The Forest 
Service would not need to follow its normal administrative appeal 
process but would instead only allow “predecisional” review.78  
Additionally, judicial review would likely be expedited, with 
preliminary injunctions limited to sixty days unless renewed by the 
court.79
B.  The Failure to Address Conflicting Science 
Along with the Forest Service’s attempts to expedite the 
administrative process for post-fire logging projects, the most 
common theme in post-fire timber sale cases has been the Forest 
Service’s unwillingness to disclose and address unfavorable science 
in EAs and EISs for the logging proposals.  This issue was addressed 
in a 1995 scientific report entitled “Wildfire and Salvage Logging: 
Recommendations for Ecologically Sound Post-fire Salvage 
Management and Other Post-fire Treatments on Federal Lands in the 
West,” commonly referred to as the Beschta Report.  The Forest 
Service’s failure to disclose and address the findings and 
 
75 Healthy Forest Restoration Act, H.R. 1904, 108th Cong. § 2(1) (2003). 
76 The Act applies to both the Forest Service and BLM.  H.R. 1904, 108th Cong. § 3(1) 
(2003). 
77 H.R. 1904, 108th Cong. § 102(a) (2003). 
78 H.R. 1904, 108th Cong. § 105(a)(2) (2003). 
79 H.R. 1904, 108th Cong. § 106(c)(2) (2003). 
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recommendations of the Beschta Report in the public NEPA 
documents for post-fire logging proposals has substantially 
contributed to the Forest Service losing a number of post-fire cases. 
The Beschta Report, prepared by a team of university and agency 
scientists, proposed guidelines for salvage logging and other post-fire 
treatments.80  The Report determined that “[t]here is no ecological 
need for immediate intervention on the post-fire landscape” and that 
given the “high degree of variability and high uncertainty about the 
impacts of post-fire responses, a conservative approach is 
warranted.”81  The Report found that where post-fire logging does 
occur, “persistent and significant adverse environmental impacts are 
likely to result,” including “soil compaction and erosion, loss of 
habitat for cavity nesting species, [and] the loss of structurally and 
fundamentally important large woody debris.”82  Because of this, the 
Report recommended that post-fire logging be prohibited on sensitive 
sites, including severely burned areas, erosive sites, steep slopes, 
roadless areas, and riparian areas.83  The Report further recommends 
that tractor logging and road building be generally prohibited when 
logging does occur.84
The Forest Service has been uneven and arbitrary in its treatment 
of the Beschta Report, which has no doubt contributed to the agency’s 
problems in court on this issue.  The agency initially viewed the 
Beschta Report as important new information for post-fire timber 
sales, as the Pacific Northwest Regional Office immediately directed 
forest supervisors to consider the Beschta Report within NEPA 
documents for post-fire logging proposals.85  This 1995 regional 
directive stated that the Report clearly needed to be considered, and 
that, in instances where the Forest Service chooses a contrary 
approach and prepares only an EA, the agency must explain why the 
different scientific conclusions did not trigger the need for a more 
detailed EIS.86
Just one year after the Beschta Report and the subsequent regional 
directive, the Tower fire burned through the North Fork John Day 
 
80 BESCHTA ET AL., supra note 51, at 2. 
81 Id. at 5. 
82 Id. at 6. 
83 Id. at 9. 
84 Id. at 9-10. 
85 See Memorandum from John Lowe, Regional Forester, to Forest Supervisors and 
Directors (June 28, 1995) (Analysis of Fire Recovery Projects) (on file with author). 
86 Id. 
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watershed on the Umatilla National Forest.  With the fire, the Forest 
Service had its first opportunity to follow the findings and 
recommendations of the Beschta Report, or at least to consider and 
address the Report in the EA and “Finding of No Significant Impact” 
that it prepared for the Big Tower logging project.  The Forest 
Service, however, did neither.  Instead, the agency proposed to log 
thirty million board feet in the high intensity burn areas, including 
2,720 acres of logging on sensitive soils, one thousand acres of tractor 
logging, and eleven miles of new road construction.87  The EA for the 
project entirely failed to mention the Beschta Report or the regional 
directive.88
Environmental groups filed suit against the Forest Service.  In the 
suit, the groups relied heavily on the regional directive to argue that 
the Forest Service’s failure to address the Beschta Report indicated 
that the impacts of the project were controversial and uncertain, thus 
requiring an EIS.  The plaintiffs lost in the district court.  On appeal, 
the project was enjoined by the Ninth Circuit.89  The Ninth Circuit 
offered “no opinion on whether the Forest Service’s omission of any 
discussion of the Beschta Report, alone, would discredit the Forest 
Service’s decision not to prepare an EIS.”90  The Ninth Circuit did 
note, however, that the Forest Service’s “failure to discuss and 
consider the Beschta Report’s recommendations lends weight to 
[plaintiffs’] claim that the Forest Service did not take the requisite 
‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of post-fire logging 
instead of letting nature do the healing.”91
After the 1999 Big Bar Complex fires on the Six Rivers National 
Forest, the Forest Service chose to prepare an EIS for its post-fire 
logging proposal but again it did not disclose or address the Beschta 
Report.  Because an EIS was prepared, however, the legal issue 
involving the Beschta Report was not whether the Report triggered 
the need for an EIS due to controversy and uncertainty.  Rather, the 
issue involved the EIS’s failure to address the scientific evidence that 
directly contradicted the agency’s post-fire proposal.92  The plaintiffs 
cited to a number of cases concerning the Northern spotted owl to 
 
87 See Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1210 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
88 Id. at 1213. 
89 Id. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. 
92 See Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 971, 977 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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argue that NEPA plainly requires an agency to disclose and respond 
to adverse scientific opinion within an EIS.93  The district court 
agreed and held that the Big Bar EIS violated NEPA “by failing to 
disclose scientific opinion that opposes post-fire logging.”94  The 
court rejected the Forest Service’s contention that it was sufficient to 
simply include the Beschta Report within the overall administrative 
record for the Big Bar project rather than addressing the Report 
within the EIS that the agency sends out to the public for comment 
and review.95
In 2000, the Hash Rock wildfire burned on the Ochoco National 
Forest in Central Oregon.96  The Forest Service prepared an EA for a 
post-fire logging proposal.  Again, the EA contained no discussion of 
the Beschta Report.97  Plaintiffs again challenged the post-fire 
proposal arguing that the failure to address the Beschta Report and 
regional directive indicated that an EIS was required.98  Similar to 
Big Bar, the Forest Service argued that its scientists read the Beschta 
Report, were familiar with it, and included a copy in the 
administrative record for the project.99  The court, however, agreed 
with the plaintiffs that the EA itself should discuss the opposing 
viewpoints.  As stated by Judge Ancer Haggerty: “The Blackwood 
decision, as well as the Regional Forester’s post-Beschta report 
directive, both make clear that some reasoned evaluation of the 
Beschta Report is essential to any salvaging proposal on a forest 
damaged by wildfire.”100
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has also had difficulty 
with the Beschta Report.  After fires in 2001 in the Central Oregon 
Resource Area, the BLM prepared an EA to assess the impacts of its 
 
93 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (2003) (the agency must discuss any “responsible 
opposing view”); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1318 (W.D. Wash. 
1994) (“[the EIS] must also disclose responsible scientific opinion in opposition to the 
proposed action, and make a good faith, reasoned response to it.” (quoting Seattle 
Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1992))); Moseley, 798 
F. Supp. at 1482 (“[t]he agency’s explanation is insufficient under NEPA—not because 
experts disagree, but because the FEIS lacks reasoned discussion of major scientific 
objections.”); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993). 
94 Bosworth, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 981. 
95 Id. at 980-81. 
96 League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064-65 (D. Or. 
2002). 
97 Id. at 1065-66. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1067. 
100 Id. at 1068. 
 
216       J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19(1), 2004] 
                                                                   
proposed Timber Basin logging project.101  Plaintiffs challenged the 
project, arguing in part that the EA failed to disclose and consider 
opposing scientific evidence, including the Beschta Report.  The court 
enjoined the project, again finding fault with the agency for failing to 
address contrary scientific evidence in the EA, and again rejecting the 
agency’s argument that the science could instead be included in the 
administrative record for the post-fire project.102
In a recent unpublished decision from the Ninth Circuit, the court 
upheld an EIS for a post-fire logging project on the Helena National 
Forest in Montana.103  The opinion is short and the facts are unclear, 
but the EIS apparently indicated that the Beschta Report was 
considered, and the Report was listed in the EIS bibliography.104  
Under these facts, the court held that an explicit discussion of the 
Beschta Report in the EIS was not required.105  In any event, because 
the decision was not selected by the Ninth Circuit for publication, it is 
not binding precedent and generally cannot be cited in future 
cases.106
Overall, the Forest Service’s failure to disclose or address the 
Beschta Report in the EAs and EISs for post-fire logging projects is 
inexplicable and inexcusable.  The Forest Service currently blames 
long-standing NEPA procedures for its failure to proceed with its 
post-fire logging proposals and it specifically cites to the Beschta 
Report to complain about an “analysis paralysis.”107  Clearly, the 
Forest Service shares much of the blame when it repeatedly fails to 
address the relevant report, even after providing itself with specific 
directions to consider the report and after court decisions have 
directed it to do so. 
C.  The Past Effects of Fire Fighting Activities 
Naturally, each post-fire logging project follows a recent wildfire.  
The Forest Service likely fought that wildfire with aggressive tactics, 
such as dropping large amounts of chemical fire retardant, bulldozing 
 
101 League of Wilderness Defenders v. Zielinski, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266 (D. Or. 
2002). 
102 Id. at 1270. 
103 Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 54 Fed. Appx. 901 (9th Cir. 2003). 
104 Id. at 904. 
105 Id. 
106 See 9TH CIR. R. 36-3. 
107 Gridlock in National Forest: Hearing Before the House Committee on House 
Resources, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dale Bosworth, Chief, USFS). 
 
Logging After Wildfire 217 
                                                                   
fire-lines, and igniting backburns.  In preparing an EA or EIS, 
agencies are required to consider cumulative impacts, which are 
defined to include past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future 
actions.108  This leads to another issue that has arisen in recent post-
fire logging cases: the Forest Service’s obligation to consider and 
disclose the past environmental impacts of its firefighting activities 
within the cumulative effects analysis for the subsequent post-fire 
logging proposals. 
One problem that plaintiffs have faced in making the argument is 
that much of the firefighting information is often undisclosed and 
difficult to obtain.109  For the Big Bar wildfires on the Six Rivers 
National Forest, the plaintiffs discovered that the Forest Service had 
bulldozed fifty miles of fire-lines and constructed another hundred 
miles of hand-lines.110  The Forest Service acknowledged that the 
dozer-lines consisted of areas where all material was removed down 
to the bare mineral soil.  Furthermore, the agency admitted that it had 
removed some spotted owl habitat, and at times, had crossed streams 
and riparian reserves.111  In addition, the Forest Service dropped 280 
tons of chemical fire retardant on the Big Bar fires.112  The Forest 
Service also logged trees to construct safety zones and helicopter 
landings in the analysis area during the fire fighting operations.113  
The Forest Service’s EIS for the subsequent logging project, however, 
did not disclose or consider any of the environmental impacts of these 
previous fire fighting activities. 
In considering plaintiffs’ administrative appeal of the Big Bar 
project, the Forest Service’s Appeal Reviewing Officer found it 
“inexcusable” for the EIS not to address the impacts of the fire-lines.  
The officer recommended that the decision approving the post-fire 
logging project be reversed “with added instructions to do the correct 
baseline analysis.”114  The Forest Service’s Appeal Deciding Officer, 
however, rejected this recommendation and affirmed the decision to 
 
108 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2002). 
109 See O’TOOLE, supra note 3, at 13. 
110 See Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 971, 985 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
111 As noted by plaintiffs’ expert in the Big Bar case, “[f]irelines cause significant and 
persistent reductions in soil productivity via elevated erosion, compaction and the removal 
of all organic matter, which is critical to soil productivity.”  Id. at 985-86 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
112 Id. at 985 n.9. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 985 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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proceed with the timber sale.115  At the district court, the Forest 
Service argued that the fire-lines had been rehabilitated and that the 
omission of the fire fighting activities from the EIS was merely a 
“technical deficiency.”116  The district court, however, agreed with 
the plaintiffs that the EIS violated NEPA in its failure to disclose the 
environmental impacts of the fire fighting tactics.117
Two recent cases in Oregon dealt with similar fire fighting impacts.  
In fighting the Hash Rock fire on the Ochoco National Forest, the 
Forest Service bulldozed thirty-five miles of fire-lines and dumped 
over 70,000 gallons of chemical fire retardant.  This information was 
again not analyzed or properly disclosed in the subsequent EA for the 
post-fire logging proposal.118  The court agreed with plaintiffs that 
these undisclosed impacts contributed to the uncertainty of the 
proposed logging project’s environmental effects, thus requiring an 
EIS.119  Similarly, in the plaintiff’s challenge to the BLM’s Timber 
Basin post-fire logging project, the court found that the EA’s 
consideration of fire fighting impacts was insufficient and contributed 
to serious questions as to whether the EA was adequate.120
Fire fighting has historically been a Forest Service activity that is 
not widely questioned by the general public or conservationists.  
However, as the agency’s fire fighting budget continues to increase, 
and a much higher percentage of the agency’s logging program 
involves post-fire timber sales, fire fighting strategies and tactics are 
gaining more attention.  For instance, Forest Service Employees for 
Environmental Ethics recently filed suit to challenge the Forest 
Service’s failure to prepare an EA or EIS for its nationwide use of 
chemical fire retardant in fighting wildfires.121  NEPA should be 
allowed to play its part in the Forest Service’s fire fighting actions 
and decisions.  This would ensure that the public is involved, that 
reasonable alternatives are considered, and that environmental 
impacts are analyzed and disclosed. 
 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 985-86 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
117 Id. at 987. 
118 League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066 (D. Or. 
2002). 
119 Id. at 1069. 
120 League of Wilderness Defenders v. Zielinski, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1271 (D. Or. 
2002). 
121 Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. USFS, No. CV 03-165-M-DWM (D. 
Mont. filed Oct. 14, 2003) (on file with author). 
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D.  Fuel Management Zones/Fuelbreaks 
Another recent issue that will likely continue to emerge in post-fire 
logging cases concerns the construction of “fuel management zones” 
(“FMZs”) or fuel breaks.  The Forest Service defines a fuel break as 
“a strategically located wide block, or strip, on which a cover of 
dense, heavy, or flammable vegetation has been permanently changed 
to one of lower fuel volume or reduced flammability.”122  The Forest 
Service appears to have an increased interest in creating permanent 
networks of fuel breaks on national forests which the agency believes 
will help in the suppression of future wildfires.  For the recent Big 
Bar project in Northern California and for the forthcoming Biscuit 
project in Southwest Oregon, the construction of many miles of 
“strategic” fuel breaks is a significant component of the projects’ 
overall purpose and need. 
The issue raised by plaintiffs with respect to fuel breaks in the Big 
Bar case concerned the maintenance necessary to ensure the 
effectiveness of the proposed permanent fuel break network.123  To 
be effective, the Forest Service must maintain fuel breaks in order to 
prevent vegetative in-growth.  Such maintenance of many miles of 
fuel breaks may be expensive and may involve the use of potentially 
harmful herbicides.124  For Big Bar, the Forest Service acknowledged 
that the proposed fuel breaks would need to be maintained every two 
to ten years, depending on how quickly brush returned.  The Forest 
Service further stated that “[i]ndefinite maintenance of the fuel breaks 
to ensure low fuel conditions is essential.”125  The EIS, however, did 
not disclose how the fuel breaks would be maintained and did not 
analyze the environmental impacts of the required maintenance.126
 
122 Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
123 Id. at 984. 
124 See Order at 1, Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Dombeck, No. Civ. S-00-
605 LKK/PAN (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2001) (on file with author).  Based on the Forest 
Service’s estimated costs, the plaintiff in Californians for Alternatives to Toxics (CATs) 
asserted that the only effective method of maintenance would be herbicides, “which, 
according to the Forest Service, is the most cost-effective method.”  Id. at 7.  The court 
noted that “[h]erbicide use can cause adverse impacts to the environment, microorganisms, 
threatened and endangered species, soils, humans, other mammalian species and aquatic 
populations, and after use two of the most commonly used herbicides, glyphosate and 
triclopyr, have been found in both the surface and ground water.”  Id. at 8. 
125 Bosworth, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 984. 
126 Id. 
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The Forest Service argued in Big Bar that the issues concerning the 
maintenance of fuel breaks was “premature and speculative.”127  The 
court concluded that the maintenance was reasonably foreseeable and 
therefore had to be addressed within the EIS because the Forest 
Service had acknowledged that fuel break maintenance was necessary 
and essential.128  The court held that “the EIS’s failure to adequately 
disclose and analyze the environmental impacts of fuel break 
maintenance violates NEPA.”129
The preferred alternative for the upcoming Biscuit post-fire 
logging project in Southwest Oregon proposes over 300 miles of 400 
foot wide FMZs.130  To create this permanent network of FMZs, 
fourteen million board feet of timber would be removed from close to 
15,000 acres.131  According to the Biscuit Draft EIS, these FMZs 
would not be designed to stop a future fire but instead would be a 
defensible space where fire managers could anchor fire-lines and 
initiate back-burns to fight future fires.132  Due to the large network 
of proposed FMZs, including those within designated old growth 
reserves, Biscuit may become the next high profile case to address 
fuel break related issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite recent setbacks in court, the Forest Service shows no signs 
of insulating itself from the controversies surrounding post-fire 
logging of national forests.  To the contrary, the Forest Service has 
significantly increased the number and size of post-fire logging 
proposals.  The most extreme example is the proposed Biscuit project 
on the Siskiyou and Rogue River National Forests, where the Forest 
Service proposes to log an unprecedented 500 million board-feet from 
29,000 acres, within the Siskiyou region of Southwest Oregon.  In 
addition to being the largest timber sale in the recent history of the 
Forest Service, Biscuit would further increase the confrontation of 
post-fire projects by logging over 12,000 acres of inventoried roadless 
areas, with more logging proposed in designated old growth reserves.  
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 985. 
129 Id. 
130 USFS, Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Biscuit Fire Recovery Project ES-7 
(2003), available at http://www.biscuitfire.com/deis/Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2004). 
131 Id. at II-23, II-29, available at http://www.biscuitfire.com/deis/chapter2.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2004). 
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The massive Biscuit proposal, along with the large number of other 
post-fire proposals across the West, indicates that the Forest Service 
still does not seek a fair and balanced compromise or solution to the 
post-fire logging controversy.  Therefore, additional litigation is likely 
in 2004. 
 
